A HISTORY OF JOINT INTELLIGENCEThe CIA's in house journal
Studies in Intelligence has published their latest online unclassified/declassified issue with an article of particular importance in a time of IC reform, titled
"The Evolution and Relevance of Joint Intelligence Centers". An excerpt:
"The passage of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act was equally important for the resurrection of JICs. The act bolstered the power of the JCS chairman by making him the principal military adviser to the president. It also improved the composition and administration of the joint staff, instituted joint professional military education requirements, and mandated that joint officers be promoted at the same rate as their service contemporaries. Lastly, the Goldwater-Nichols Act granted the unified and specified combatant commanders more autonomy and authority.[45] A stronger JCS chairman and more powerful commanders in turn generated more robust intelligence requirements— requirements best met by a joint staff J-2 and a JIC. In fact, the JCS chairman, General Colin Powell, was instrumental in supporting efforts to create the J-2 position within DIA.[46]......JIC-level analytical expertise is particularly critical for today's counterterrorism operations. While transnational organizations, such as al-Qa'ida, are best tracked and assessed at the national level, the increasing trend toward franchise terrorist operations and splinter groups has reinforced the need for counterterrorism expertise and databases at the theater level. This same requirement has driven the establishment of Joint Interagency Coordination Groups at the theater commands, bringing together multiple organizations besides the military to plan and execute counterterrorism operations.[54]Beyond conflict, the emerging “Lily Pad” basing strategy being advocated by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to support the war on terrorism and other modern military operations portends a significant role for theater JICs. The strategy envisions replacing large established installations in Western Europe and the Far East with small bases closer to potential crisis areas. While it may make sense to reduce the US footprint in areas like Germany, Japan, and Korea, downsizing or eliminating theater JICs does not. The regional expertise of JIC personnel and interaction with key liaison services will be integral to the support of forces deployed to the bare bones forward bases envisioned for Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Africa.[55]"