Wednesday, January 19, 2005
A LITTLE TOO QUIET
I have not yet commented upon the Hersh piece regarding Iran *yet because I am coincidentally finishing The Persian Puzzle by Kenneth Pollack and I'm digesting what he has to say and how he said it. My preliminary compliment is that I learned some things I was not aware of previously and that Pollock does an excellent job, former NSC staffer that he is, in terms of laying out the pros and cons of various policy options with Iran. Here's an interesting quote to juxtapose with the recent news:
"...as part of the Third Track[ Pollack's diplomatic strategy], the United States should make a major intelligence effort-akin to the increase in our efforts against al Qa'eda after 9/11- to gather information regarding Iran's nuclear program in the hope of developing a viable counterproliferation strike option"
* Hersh, incidentally, does not understand his history if he believes the Bush II administration even remotely approaches the iron-clad and centralized control over the IC and ability to execute genuinely covert operations exercised by Eisenhower.
¶ 8:39 PM
I have not yet commented upon the Hersh piece regarding Iran *yet because I am coincidentally finishing The Persian Puzzle by Kenneth Pollack and I'm digesting what he has to say and how he said it. My preliminary compliment is that I learned some things I was not aware of previously and that Pollock does an excellent job, former NSC staffer that he is, in terms of laying out the pros and cons of various policy options with Iran. Here's an interesting quote to juxtapose with the recent news:
"...as part of the Third Track[ Pollack's diplomatic strategy], the United States should make a major intelligence effort-akin to the increase in our efforts against al Qa'eda after 9/11- to gather information regarding Iran's nuclear program in the hope of developing a viable counterproliferation strike option"
* Hersh, incidentally, does not understand his history if he believes the Bush II administration even remotely approaches the iron-clad and centralized control over the IC and ability to execute genuinely covert operations exercised by Eisenhower.
¶ 8:39 PM
Comments:
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I heard a CNN radio interview with Pollack in which he reaffirmed that view, and then went on to say that the notion that the Iranians will revolt in the event of a strike on their nuclear facilities is a fantasy. I'm inclined to agree with both statements, although I'm not too confident in the likes of Richard Secord to do a good job running the MEK, assuming that's what's going on.
-praktike
-praktike
# posted by 
: Thursday, 20 January, 2005
: Thursday, 20 January, 2005
I have to agree with you Praktike.
A strike on Iran's nuclear program should be carried out on its own merits - to cripple the Iranian nuclear program if that is possible. Once you begin trying to add in speculative political nuances and signal-sending you dilute the military effectiveness of the operation. If we are going to reap the diplomatic and other costs of Persian-version of an Osirak raid then the raid must be as effective as possible.
The regime in Teheran is widely hated by their own people but they are not yet in Ceaucescu's or Saddam's league. They still command a sizable minority of support - at least 15 %.
Moreover the regime is trying not to antagonize the majority into open revolt so Khameini is keeping a leash on his most radical fellow mullahs and Pasdaran advisers. The people will not rise up unless the regime does something extraordinairly provocative and/or seems indecisive about shooting down unarmed protestors.
Our real problem here isn't actually the proliferation but whose finger would be on the button. Khameini is a hardliner, he's not overly bright and he hates the United States BUT he has a political boss' or bureaucrat's sense of pragmatic limits to the uses of power. There are worse people in Iran however.
Khameini however could easily die of illness, age related malady or assassination. His office would pass to a senior, probably more radical and isolated mullah follower of Khomeini.
It's really not particularly wise to let such irresponsible and irrational calculators have nukes and its worth a fair amount to the United States in terms of offering incentives to Teheran or inflicting pain on them prevent that eventuality.
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A strike on Iran's nuclear program should be carried out on its own merits - to cripple the Iranian nuclear program if that is possible. Once you begin trying to add in speculative political nuances and signal-sending you dilute the military effectiveness of the operation. If we are going to reap the diplomatic and other costs of Persian-version of an Osirak raid then the raid must be as effective as possible.
The regime in Teheran is widely hated by their own people but they are not yet in Ceaucescu's or Saddam's league. They still command a sizable minority of support - at least 15 %.
Moreover the regime is trying not to antagonize the majority into open revolt so Khameini is keeping a leash on his most radical fellow mullahs and Pasdaran advisers. The people will not rise up unless the regime does something extraordinairly provocative and/or seems indecisive about shooting down unarmed protestors.
Our real problem here isn't actually the proliferation but whose finger would be on the button. Khameini is a hardliner, he's not overly bright and he hates the United States BUT he has a political boss' or bureaucrat's sense of pragmatic limits to the uses of power. There are worse people in Iran however.
Khameini however could easily die of illness, age related malady or assassination. His office would pass to a senior, probably more radical and isolated mullah follower of Khomeini.
It's really not particularly wise to let such irresponsible and irrational calculators have nukes and its worth a fair amount to the United States in terms of offering incentives to Teheran or inflicting pain on them prevent that eventuality.
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