As far as Big Ticket Navy/Air Force spending goes, this seems in line with Barnett's vision -- if not his suggestions.

Disconnectedness doesn't define danger. Barnett even writes we will only face terrorism in/from Africa after we clear it out of the more connected Middle East. "Alternate Modernizations" define danger, be it transnational Caliphism or the Neoleninist dreams of some in China.

To fight these, we need a many-and-cheap SysAdmin and a few-and-expensive Leviathan. The SysAdmin should be a multilateral, multinational force that wins the peace, while the Leviathan should be the unilateral, uninational force that wins the war.

And of these two, the Leviathan is more important than the SysAdmin in shrinking the Gap. Ultimately globalization has a gravitational pull of its own. Even a European approach of appeasement would slowly shrink the Gap, as enemies are paid off and the logic of economic integration takes its time to ensnare the minds of leaders.

Far, far more dangerous is the idea that China could sabotage the modern stage of globalization. It ultimately matters little to us, globalization, or history whether the 800 million in Africa are connected in two generations or three. But if China does something stupid that really puts India and Japan on the defensive, then Asia's right back to the 1930s. 3 billion Asians are simply worth more than 1 billion Africans.

The way we prevent this is by maintaining the ability to conventionally destroy China's navy, rapidly. An American Navy and Air Force able to send Beijing's boats to the bottom is a credible deterrent, because the PRC would never have to resort to nuclear weapons (no land invasion and no nuclear attack means the CCP may be able to hold on to power internally, deterring them from a nuclear counter-strike).

Globalization is like adolescence in a child: it wins on its own. The SysAdmin is aspirin to the growing pains of globalization. But the Leviathan is the antipsychotic which keeps the Core peaceful.

Dan tdaxp
 

...and where is the manpower supposed to come from? There are not exactly long lines at recruiting centers. The draft has no chance politically; although perhaps if it is reborn as a mandatory, universal 1-2 year national service requirement where people get to choose between a few alternatives (one of which being the military).

Barnabus
 

Of course, it's not really a binary choice. You have to balance what you spend on hi-tech and expensive weapons, low-tech and cheap weapons, manpower, spares and so forth. This is basic economics: the allocation of finite resources.

It's possible to go too far to one side, of course, and to sacrifice all other aspects, or some other aspect to make sure we keep buying the shiny things. On the other hand, it's possible to stint on the shiny things to pay for more of the other stuff. But that has consequences, too. If we don't have a strong blue-water navy, and a strong air force able to beat the best systems in the world, we don't have any way to deter China. And while Barnett's theory is lovely and all, I wouldn't bet Taiwan and our economy on it just yet.

So we still need both the shiny things and the people, and there are only two ways to get them. Either we increase the funding or we decrease our target capabilities. Anything else is just fiddling at the margins, which is what Barnett seems to have gotten so worked up about. It looks to me like Barnett is either reacting defensively to a challenge to his theory, or he's having a "can't see the forest for the trees" problem.

In any case, I'm concerned if the military dramatically slows down transformation of divisions into BCTs, or if we stop buying spares and ammunition (like we did in the 1970s and, IIRC, the 1990s), or if we radically define our intended capabilities downwards. Short of that, I'm prepared to accept that the OSD is generally competent and makes good decisions, at least under the current SecDef and President.
 

Of course, it's not really a binary choice. You have to balance what you spend on hi-tech and expensive weapons, low-tech and cheap weapons, manpower, spares and so forth. This is basic economics: the allocation of finite resources.

It's possible to go too far to one side, of course, and to sacrifice all other aspects, or some other aspect to make sure we keep buying the shiny things. On the other hand, it's possible to stint on the shiny things to pay for more of the other stuff. But that has consequences, too. If we don't have a strong blue-water navy, and a strong air force able to beat the best systems in the world, we don't have any way to deter China. And while Barnett's theory is lovely and all, I wouldn't bet Taiwan and our economy on it just yet.

So we still need both the shiny things and the people, and there are only two ways to get them. Either we increase the funding or we decrease our target capabilities. Anything else is just fiddling at the margins, which is what Barnett seems to have gotten so worked up about. It looks to me like Barnett is either reacting defensively to a challenge to his theory, or he's having a "can't see the forest for the trees" problem.

In any case, I'm concerned if the military dramatically slows down transformation of divisions into BCTs, or if we stop buying spares and ammunition (like we did in the 1970s and, IIRC, the 1990s), or if we radically define our intended capabilities downwards. Short of that, I'm prepared to accept that the OSD is generally competent and makes good decisions, at least under the current SecDef and President.
 

Of course, it's not really a binary choice. You have to balance what you spend on hi-tech and expensive weapons, low-tech and cheap weapons, manpower, spares and so forth. This is basic economics: the allocation of finite resources.

It's possible to go too far to one side, of course, and to sacrifice all other aspects, or some other aspect to make sure we keep buying the shiny things. On the other hand, it's possible to stint on the shiny things to pay for more of the other stuff. But that has consequences, too. If we don't have a strong blue-water navy, and a strong air force able to beat the best systems in the world, we don't have any way to deter China. And while Barnett's theory is lovely and all, I wouldn't bet Taiwan and our economy on it just yet.

So we still need both the shiny things and the people, and there are only two ways to get them. Either we increase the funding or we decrease our target capabilities. Anything else is just fiddling at the margins, which is what Barnett seems to have gotten so worked up about. It looks to me like Barnett is either reacting defensively to a challenge to his theory, or he's having a "can't see the forest for the trees" problem.

In any case, I'm concerned if the military dramatically slows down transformation of divisions into BCTs, or if we stop buying spares and ammunition (like we did in the 1970s and, IIRC, the 1990s), or if we radically define our intended capabilities downwards. Short of that, I'm prepared to accept that the OSD is generally competent and makes good decisions, at least under the current SecDef and President.
 

Gak! Sorry for the triple post. Blogger was being odd, there.
 

Interesting discussion on the military. MS thinks that transforming the US forces for SysAdmin duties is desirable, but in serious trouble. Barnabus counters that the US doesn't have the voluntary manpower; incidentally this is a reason why the duties have been a multilateral enterprise in the past - most UN peacekeeping duties are carried out by developing nations. Dan suggests instead that the US should favour 'big ticket' items, rather than boots on the ground.

Well, the Department of Defense seems open to ideas. It is sponsoring a seminar series at John Hopkins University to look for the way ahead. Here is an intriguing contribution from Asia.
 

"And while Barnett's theory is lovely and all, I wouldn't bet Taiwan and our economy on it just yet."

Jeff, I feel compelled to point out that Barnett advocates getting rid of our security guarantee to Taiwan in order to remove the only potential flashpoint between the US and China. He doesn't want to bet the world economy on Taiwan staying moderate.

I'm not saying I agree with Barnett on all of this (it makes complete sense based on his vision but it really makes me uncomfortable to say so clearly to Taiwan "we're cutting you loose"), I just want to clarify that Barnett isn't worried about deterring China, he's worried about forging a strategic partnership with China.
 

Thank you IJ !

I agree Jeff that it should not be a case of either-or. Nor am I against having a high-tech " Leviathan" arsenal. We need boots and smart bombs alike.

At the moment though, we're having a real manpower crisis. A 10 division army doesn't work for the scope of our defense commitments, never mind actually fighting a 4GW opponent. We have already *doubled* guard and reservist call-up time. We are maxed out and the hamfisted budget manuver to slash 40k more troops and civ personnel at this moment in time is just Pentagon turf/budget war by guys who are going on to high-paid jobs with defense contractors. This isn't fat being cut here but muscle and bone.

It's incredibly shortsighted and we need to be realistic about the active duty force we need which will take a good 3-5 years to build up to ( my personal preference is no fewer than 16 Army divisions and a significantly increased USMC but there must be trade-offs)
 

IJ,

Thanks for the comments. The link, as self-defined "worst cases," aren't debatable, because by definition they have to be the worst possible outcome. Except wouldn't nuclear obliteration be even worse?

Barnett seems to be abandoning his goal of transforming the Army into the SysAdmin. He increasingly speaks of the US providing the "hub" of a mutinational, largely private-sector SysAdmin. Perhaps this is in reaction to seeing a version of his original, aggressive SysAdmin being so accurately described by Niall Ferguson - both in Dr. Ferguson's analysis and analogy.

If we want a unilateral SysAdmin, able to occupy countries indefinitely at will, then force transformation for the Army has to be the main priority. If we abandon the notion of unilateral occupation, then we can build the "hub" the hub of the SysAdmin more carefully while focusing on our core competency of Big War.

To put it starkly, is it more important for globalization for America to defend Taiwan alone or Iraq alone?

Dan tdaxp
 

I'm reeling with the links, Dan. They move the matter on, and largely support the view that - until global security arrangements can be finalised - US taxpayers should continue to buy big ticket military items for foreign adventures and forego (sacrifice?) boots on the ground. For example, once the US has removed another nation's regime it's the responsibility of someone else to mop up and impose order.

The rule-set is the US's, and therefore lacks wide legitimacy. You can understand why this unilateralism isn't popular with the rest of the world. But we're short of alternatives. There's a lot of effort in Asia at present to build security alliances - but little sign of a coherent world view emerging.
 

IJ,

American should buy big-ticket items to prevent foreign adventures. Aircraft carriers, hunter/killer subs, etc, are most successful when they are not used. And they are nearly useless against tinpot enemies.

For example, once the US has removed another nation's regime it's the responsibility of someone else to mop up and impose order.

I don't know your views on the matter, so I will address my comments more generally: the "blame America first" reflex is amusing. The US reconstructs a country? Imperialism! The US leverages local stakeholders? Irresponsible!

The rule-set is the US's, and therefore lacks wide legitimacy.

If that rule-set was the US's, the Iraq War would have gone much more smoothly.

Dan tdaxp
 

Dan, thanks for the feedback. The DoD are sponsoring the inquiry at John Hopkins. Past lectures are here.

The issues being explored are: what are the future security issues that are facing the US and its allies; what and where are the future potential threats; what are the elements of national and coalition power that might be brought to bear on the future; what are the current gaps in national and coalition power; how can the US and its allies get out in front of a lot of problems and prevent problems from occurring; and what constitutes victory and what is a desired end state in various conflicts.

The fourth speaker in the series (after Kaplan, Barnett and Corpus) is Theresa Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs. The university hopes future speakers will be (excuse any spelling mistakes) Amery Levins from the Rocky Mountain Institute to talk about energy policy; Newt Gingrich on Iran; Peter Schwarz - a writer on alternative futures; and Sean O'Brian fron the centre of army analysis looking into the stability needs of countries.
 

Col. Boyd, who gave us great insight into military strategy, said the most important need for winning war is to have a grand strategy. In Iraq we mistook military transformation as a grand strategy, and its not. We mistook the talking points of: WMD, he tried to kill my daddy, and free Iraqis from a ruthless tyrant as grand strategy, and it’s not. As Condoleezza Rice said in her testimony to congress, to paraphrase, after removing Saddam we needed another strategy so we decided to use Iraq’s new democracy to change the totalitarian governments of the region. To me this is a declaration of war, but still is not a grand strategy.
Thomas P.M. Barnett gives us a grand strategy. I believe it is a good strategy, I simply haven’t found in it a way to handle the events I envision.
I believe there are going to be huge events in China in which we will end up being on the side of the Chinese government’s military crackdown of its own people. I believe unless we plan for this event, it will ultimately lead to the downfall of the USA. I believe this because I believe North Korea is the shadow of China, much like Mexico is our shadow. These shadow countries are run like the wealthy of China and USA wants each other’s countries to distribute wealth. However the countries of North Korea and Mexico are failed states. Their people are leaving for and immigrating to other countries; this condition is called losing assets. Because they are losing assets, they are simply the shadows of China and USA, and not what’s brought to light. Because of China’s shadow, I don’t believe much of the information coming from the Chinese government. It’s kind of like the bird flu happening in China. It makes more sense to me that thousands have it and got running noses. A few have gotten sick, and half of those have died. But what we are to believe, with the available information from China, is that there are a few cases of bird flu and half of those have died. It makes more sense to me that people living with birds may develop bodies able to adapt to their environment. Once I see information coming from China that makes sense to me, like the death of Kim’s government, I might be able to change to a grand strategy such as Dr. Barnett’s.
However, just because I haven’t accepted Dr. Barnett’s grand strategy, I don’t believe in breaking apart his grand vision either. To me you either grab hold of a vision (critics might say drink the Kool-aid) or you offer a vision of your own. I haven’t drunk the Kool-aid yet, but I also haven’t found any other visions floating around that answer my questions on the conditions of the world that is foreign to me.
Condoleezza Rice may have a vision for the Middle East, but I haven’t seen where this “vision” ties into Asia. Its like they have this vertical mind that handles China one way, handles Iraq another, handles South America still differently, handles Russia in still another way and so on. This is not a grand strategy. Because of oil and how we deal with Islam, Asia is just as much a part of our involvement in Iraq as Osama, maybe even more so. As we slip into bed with China and our corporations hug the warmth (maximized profits) of a totalitarian society, are we the ones to be bringing democracy to the Middle East? As long as North Korea remains a shadow of China, there is no reason for me to believe China has given up or is able to give up her implicit laws of a benevolent leader.
As to our leaders, the lack of being able to deal with more than one OODA loop at a time is one problem with having a leader with only vertical attributes. They can be cheerleaders but not men and women of vision. They can successfully return to the orientation loop over and over again, but that is not a grand strategy.
A grand strategy counters all forms of 4GW. A grand strategy gives a quick OODA loop to our solders handling civilians, opponent or prisoners on the battlefield. A grand strategy heals the horizontal forces at home. A grand strategy shows our image in true light. A grand strategy can be passed on.
It sounds like what is going on at John Hopkins is a great, even though late, start at a grand strategy for foreign policy. I wish them well.