Wednesday, March 22, 2006
IRAN AS A SOVIETOLOGY FLASHBACK
The Brezhnevian mediocrity posing as Iran's Supreme Guide, Ayatollah Khameini ( or Grand Ayatollah, as he claims, without much evidence by Shiite scholarly standards) has ruled in favor of talks with the United States over the fate of Iraq. This move, was in my view, rather interesting on a number of levels.
The problem with dissecting Iranian politics - aside from the dearth of American scholars and USG analysts with a reasonable command of Farsi and real "in-country" experience - is that we have a faction-ridden elite whose convoluted machinations are mostly opaque. In terms of depth, our sources for Iran are quite poor , a condition that long preceded the revolution in 1979 due to the bipartisan acquiescence of multiple American administrations to the paranoid wishes of that man of straw, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, to hobble CIA activity in his country. As such we are left groping in the dark to understand the latest turn of events. Here is my view:
First, it is useful to recall as we ponder Iraq, regardless of the mistakes that the Bush administration has made since the fall of Saddam, we do not have to live next door to Iraq but the Iranians do. Moreover, their oil-rich provinces are home to an Arab minority just as their northwestern borderland houses Kurdish tribes. A nightmare scenario in Iraq has unavoidable spillover costs for an Iranian regime that is most likely better at formenting chaos than trying to suppress it on their own turf.
Secondly, Iran's ruling clerical elite have been badly divided by the rise of ultra-hardline President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has his supporters among a minority of the senior ayatollahs who previously blocked any bold moves on Supreme Guide Khameini's part. The Clinton administration had previously reached out to Iran, offering a truckling apology for the CIA toppling of the erratic Mossadegh in 1953, only to be sharply rebuffed by Khameini who lacked much freedom to buck the clerical consensus on " The Great Satan".
Beyond that, I'm not sure we know any more about Iran's internal politics than we did in the days of the Soviet Union where analysts poured over pictures of the Politburo reviewing parades from Lenin's tomb for clues to the inner workings of elite Soviet decision making. An approach I never gave much credence - after all, didn't these old guys need to use the restroom ? Run behind schedule because of infirmities ? Yet great import was placed on the body language and proximity of septuagenarian Communist bureaucrats trying to weather a public appearance for hours in the bitter Moscow cold. A ritual that killed more than one elderly Politburo member, including Leonid Brezhnev.
Trying to decipher Iran's mullocracy reminds me a lot of Sovietology. We may be looking at all the wrong things. ¶ 8:07 PM
The Brezhnevian mediocrity posing as Iran's Supreme Guide, Ayatollah Khameini ( or Grand Ayatollah, as he claims, without much evidence by Shiite scholarly standards) has ruled in favor of talks with the United States over the fate of Iraq. This move, was in my view, rather interesting on a number of levels.
The problem with dissecting Iranian politics - aside from the dearth of American scholars and USG analysts with a reasonable command of Farsi and real "in-country" experience - is that we have a faction-ridden elite whose convoluted machinations are mostly opaque. In terms of depth, our sources for Iran are quite poor , a condition that long preceded the revolution in 1979 due to the bipartisan acquiescence of multiple American administrations to the paranoid wishes of that man of straw, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, to hobble CIA activity in his country. As such we are left groping in the dark to understand the latest turn of events. Here is my view:
First, it is useful to recall as we ponder Iraq, regardless of the mistakes that the Bush administration has made since the fall of Saddam, we do not have to live next door to Iraq but the Iranians do. Moreover, their oil-rich provinces are home to an Arab minority just as their northwestern borderland houses Kurdish tribes. A nightmare scenario in Iraq has unavoidable spillover costs for an Iranian regime that is most likely better at formenting chaos than trying to suppress it on their own turf.
Secondly, Iran's ruling clerical elite have been badly divided by the rise of ultra-hardline President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has his supporters among a minority of the senior ayatollahs who previously blocked any bold moves on Supreme Guide Khameini's part. The Clinton administration had previously reached out to Iran, offering a truckling apology for the CIA toppling of the erratic Mossadegh in 1953, only to be sharply rebuffed by Khameini who lacked much freedom to buck the clerical consensus on " The Great Satan".
Beyond that, I'm not sure we know any more about Iran's internal politics than we did in the days of the Soviet Union where analysts poured over pictures of the Politburo reviewing parades from Lenin's tomb for clues to the inner workings of elite Soviet decision making. An approach I never gave much credence - after all, didn't these old guys need to use the restroom ? Run behind schedule because of infirmities ? Yet great import was placed on the body language and proximity of septuagenarian Communist bureaucrats trying to weather a public appearance for hours in the bitter Moscow cold. A ritual that killed more than one elderly Politburo member, including Leonid Brezhnev.
Trying to decipher Iran's mullocracy reminds me a lot of Sovietology. We may be looking at all the wrong things. ¶ 8:07 PM
Comments:
<< Home
Interesting and valuable comparison Mark. Two observations:
1) I don't think the machinations of power in Iran are as opaque as the Sovs. There is much discussion of politics on the Persian street, anybody who goes there can listen in, and technology allows us a glimpe into it even from here.
2) I think the mullahs really might actually have real power. I fear that we might be falling into the same trap the the Carter admin did in thinking that Tehran represents Iran. Every pundit knows that Tehranis are pro-American... we read it on their blogs and see it in the student demos of Tehran University. But your average Qomi or Yazdi, who doesn't have a blog for people in the West to read, probably has a totally different view. It is the old problem of having embassies only in the capital. We need penetration into the provinces.
So, to get back on to topic, I agree that there is a lack of collection and analysis going on, but I think we could do much better than in the days of Brezh. Also, I think we have to be careful with any increased capability because we might end up "looking at all the wrong things."
1) I don't think the machinations of power in Iran are as opaque as the Sovs. There is much discussion of politics on the Persian street, anybody who goes there can listen in, and technology allows us a glimpe into it even from here.
2) I think the mullahs really might actually have real power. I fear that we might be falling into the same trap the the Carter admin did in thinking that Tehran represents Iran. Every pundit knows that Tehranis are pro-American... we read it on their blogs and see it in the student demos of Tehran University. But your average Qomi or Yazdi, who doesn't have a blog for people in the West to read, probably has a totally different view. It is the old problem of having embassies only in the capital. We need penetration into the provinces.
So, to get back on to topic, I agree that there is a lack of collection and analysis going on, but I think we could do much better than in the days of Brezh. Also, I think we have to be careful with any increased capability because we might end up "looking at all the wrong things."
All valid points.
I definitely agree that the Iranian intelligentsia speak and write more freely today than did the Russians thirty years ago - the lack of comprehension is on our end, linguistically speaking. Far more American USG personnel and academics spoke Russian,understood Russian culture and Communist politics back then than today know Farsi or understand Shiite Islam
Post a Comment
I definitely agree that the Iranian intelligentsia speak and write more freely today than did the Russians thirty years ago - the lack of comprehension is on our end, linguistically speaking. Far more American USG personnel and academics spoke Russian,understood Russian culture and Communist politics back then than today know Farsi or understand Shiite Islam
<< Home
