Friday, January 12, 2007
THE SMALL WARS JOURNAL BLOG
Via email, Dave Dilegge let me know that The Small Wars Journal has begun its own blog , which featured a post, "A Framework for thinking about Iraq Strategy", by LTC David Kilcullen, a special adviser to the Department of State and an expert on counterinsurgency warfare. An excerpt:
"This is a model, not a strategy. That is, it is a systematic oversimplification, designed to clarify an extremely complex, rapidly-changing reality. It does not tell us what to do in Iraq, but is a basis for evaluating options. It is wrong – all models are – but applied tentatively, with skepticism, and with constant and rigorous “ground truth” from first-hand observation in theater, I have sometimes found it useful.
....The “Four Problems” concept
In essence, the model suggests that Iraq comprises four strategic problems:
an underlying nation-building problem, resulting from the fact that Iraq is a weak and fragile state, and three overlapping security problems that sit “above” that underlying problem, and make it harder to get at it. The three problems are:
Terrorism – that is, the presence of terrorist entities including (but not limited to) AQI who seek to exploit the situation in Iraq to further extremist or trans-national aims
Insurgency – the (primarily Sunni) rebellion against the new post-Saddam order in Iraq, including rebellion against both the coalition presence and the new Iraqi government, and
Communal Conflict – including sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shi’a elements, and ethnic conflict between Kurds, Arabs and other ethnic groups.
These three security problems overlap: incidents may involve elements of more than one dimension – for example, some terrorism is “pure” AQI activity, while other terrorist acts are insurgent-motivated, and yet others incorporate a sectarian dimension. Most incidents in fact include elements of two dynamics, or all three. You might think of the three problems as a Venn diagram of overlapping circles, each constantly changing in size, with any incident able to be plotted somewhere within the interaction of the three dynamics – terrorism, insurgency and communal conflict."
It is a post of high quality and significant length which you can read in full here. Kilcullen references Iraq as a "wicked problem", a subject I have blogged about previously for those interested in the term.
If I may make a suggestion, one element that needs to be added for clarity's sake is some sort of "about us" that is germane to the blog rather than the SWJ as a whole. Who is/are/will be the regular bloggers at the SWJ Blog ? Dave Dilegge promises a varied stable of contributors so I'm looking forward to making SWJ Blog a regular read. ¶ 7:40 PM
Via email, Dave Dilegge let me know that The Small Wars Journal has begun its own blog , which featured a post, "A Framework for thinking about Iraq Strategy", by LTC David Kilcullen, a special adviser to the Department of State and an expert on counterinsurgency warfare. An excerpt:
"This is a model, not a strategy. That is, it is a systematic oversimplification, designed to clarify an extremely complex, rapidly-changing reality. It does not tell us what to do in Iraq, but is a basis for evaluating options. It is wrong – all models are – but applied tentatively, with skepticism, and with constant and rigorous “ground truth” from first-hand observation in theater, I have sometimes found it useful.
....The “Four Problems” concept
In essence, the model suggests that Iraq comprises four strategic problems:
an underlying nation-building problem, resulting from the fact that Iraq is a weak and fragile state, and three overlapping security problems that sit “above” that underlying problem, and make it harder to get at it. The three problems are:
Terrorism – that is, the presence of terrorist entities including (but not limited to) AQI who seek to exploit the situation in Iraq to further extremist or trans-national aims
Insurgency – the (primarily Sunni) rebellion against the new post-Saddam order in Iraq, including rebellion against both the coalition presence and the new Iraqi government, and
Communal Conflict – including sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shi’a elements, and ethnic conflict between Kurds, Arabs and other ethnic groups.
These three security problems overlap: incidents may involve elements of more than one dimension – for example, some terrorism is “pure” AQI activity, while other terrorist acts are insurgent-motivated, and yet others incorporate a sectarian dimension. Most incidents in fact include elements of two dynamics, or all three. You might think of the three problems as a Venn diagram of overlapping circles, each constantly changing in size, with any incident able to be plotted somewhere within the interaction of the three dynamics – terrorism, insurgency and communal conflict."
It is a post of high quality and significant length which you can read in full here. Kilcullen references Iraq as a "wicked problem", a subject I have blogged about previously for those interested in the term.
If I may make a suggestion, one element that needs to be added for clarity's sake is some sort of "about us" that is germane to the blog rather than the SWJ as a whole. Who is/are/will be the regular bloggers at the SWJ Blog ? Dave Dilegge promises a varied stable of contributors so I'm looking forward to making SWJ Blog a regular read. ¶ 7:40 PM
Comments:
<< Home
Mark, suggestion noted re the tailored "about the blog" at SWJ -- that is very much in our plan. We have a bit more window dressing to do, and it will include the info you are talking about. But we crossed the LD anyway, and the entries are starting to flow.
First, we will wait to out and about our contributors until they actually contribute, just so they are not under any pressure by a public outing. Second, regular contribution in our schema may still be intermittent, but we're confident there will be a good volume flow from the group at large, in addition to high quality ensured by the caliber of the individuals.
Thanks for noting our launch, and for your continued participation in and advancement of the Small Wars community, here and elsewhere about the net.
- Bill @ smallwarsjournal.com
Post a Comment
First, we will wait to out and about our contributors until they actually contribute, just so they are not under any pressure by a public outing. Second, regular contribution in our schema may still be intermittent, but we're confident there will be a good volume flow from the group at large, in addition to high quality ensured by the caliber of the individuals.
Thanks for noting our launch, and for your continued participation in and advancement of the Small Wars community, here and elsewhere about the net.
- Bill @ smallwarsjournal.com
# posted by 
: Saturday, 13 January, 2007
: Saturday, 13 January, 2007
<< Home
