Saturday, September 04, 2004
AN ALLIANCE OF NECESSITY ?
This is a passing thought more than a substantive post but it seems to me that increasingly America's alliances will become dissected by the diverging legal and military realities of the Core and the Gap.
Our political allies will remain the Europeans and Japan - the Kantian Rule set Old Core - that have essentially made the economic choice to eschew the ability to project much military power. Great Britain is currently an exception as they retain substantial military capability and political will to tackle Leviathan type interventions. This however will change when the British begin integrating some of their key combat ready units with those of the French, gaining nothing for British interests but giving Paris an effective veto over British participation in future interventions. As the last few years have shown, if the French have a veto, they will obstruct because they are a status quo power deeply invested in maximizing the spread of Kantian Rule sets in the Core. The world is changing, moving " backwards" from their perspective and the French are doing their best to yell " halt! " ( or " s'arrêter! " ).
America's military allies, and I use the term " ally" loosely because we are less likely to be bound by formal treaty than by mutual interests, will be the New Core states of Russia, India, China and Israel plus always reliable " old Core" Australia and the odd opportunistic regional power. Sort of a "Coalitions of the Willing and Able " scenario. What we have in common with these states is that all of them face potential threats- often from militant Islamists or ethnic separtists- that require real and robust military responses with rules of engagement written by field generals instead of lawyers working for Amnesty International. It is to these states that America will increasingly look to for military cooperation. Indeed, many of the interventions are apt to take place on the Gap borderlands of these New Core states.
UPDATE: No sooner do I write this but I get a report from the Belmont Club regarding the EU reaction to the slaughter in Russia that basically proves my point with greater eloquence than I can muster.
¶ 8:27 PM
This is a passing thought more than a substantive post but it seems to me that increasingly America's alliances will become dissected by the diverging legal and military realities of the Core and the Gap.
Our political allies will remain the Europeans and Japan - the Kantian Rule set Old Core - that have essentially made the economic choice to eschew the ability to project much military power. Great Britain is currently an exception as they retain substantial military capability and political will to tackle Leviathan type interventions. This however will change when the British begin integrating some of their key combat ready units with those of the French, gaining nothing for British interests but giving Paris an effective veto over British participation in future interventions. As the last few years have shown, if the French have a veto, they will obstruct because they are a status quo power deeply invested in maximizing the spread of Kantian Rule sets in the Core. The world is changing, moving " backwards" from their perspective and the French are doing their best to yell " halt! " ( or " s'arrêter! " ).
America's military allies, and I use the term " ally" loosely because we are less likely to be bound by formal treaty than by mutual interests, will be the New Core states of Russia, India, China and Israel plus always reliable " old Core" Australia and the odd opportunistic regional power. Sort of a "Coalitions of the Willing and Able " scenario. What we have in common with these states is that all of them face potential threats- often from militant Islamists or ethnic separtists- that require real and robust military responses with rules of engagement written by field generals instead of lawyers working for Amnesty International. It is to these states that America will increasingly look to for military cooperation. Indeed, many of the interventions are apt to take place on the Gap borderlands of these New Core states.
UPDATE: No sooner do I write this but I get a report from the Belmont Club regarding the EU reaction to the slaughter in Russia that basically proves my point with greater eloquence than I can muster.
¶ 8:27 PM
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Military strength must follow economic strength. In that respect Japan is much more significant power than France, even though Japan does not loudly assert its national opinions, whereas France does.
Agreed.
Japan's security posture is unique in history, a major power putting all of it's key defense decisions substantially in the hands of a foreign power. This works because it defuses an internal political debate regarding militarism inside Japan and Japan's neighbiors prefer the U.S.-Japan security treaty system to a Japan unbound.
The French, while neither a significant economic or military power any more ( except for their Force de frappe nukes) have managed to leverage themselves into the arbiter of EU policy in those areas - which IS significant.
Japan's security posture is unique in history, a major power putting all of it's key defense decisions substantially in the hands of a foreign power. This works because it defuses an internal political debate regarding militarism inside Japan and Japan's neighbiors prefer the U.S.-Japan security treaty system to a Japan unbound.
The French, while neither a significant economic or military power any more ( except for their Force de frappe nukes) have managed to leverage themselves into the arbiter of EU policy in those areas - which IS significant.
The French position is very complex and relates to various national myths which need to be "exploded" before they can move on. Basically no French politician has told the French people that they are no longer a great power either economically or militarily. They get away with this because France is undeniably a great power culturally, and through the "smoke and mirrors" of the EU they appear to be a great power politically (also they do have considerable diplomatic talent). But when France takes a position hostile to (say) US interests, it does not mean they are hostile to the US per se, it just means that they have to take an independent line to justify their position as a "great" power. This posturing is for internal consumption. France pretends to be stronger than she really is, just as the UK pretends to be weaker than she really is.
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