Sunday, November 04, 2007
RECOMMENDED READING
Sunday, Sunday, Sunday...where blog reaction is the attraction!
Sean Meade - "Catch-22"
Sean puts away his proofreader's blue pencil and dons the Hat of Literary Criticism to make an (accurate) point about generational zeitgeist.
Global Guerillas - "ON OPEN SOURCE GUERRILLA VANGUARDS"
Great theory post by John Robb. I'd say that the Maoists exploited a latent crisis of legitimacy rather than created one "ex nihilo". Both the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang were a reaction against the collapse of the Q'ing and the inability Yuan Shih-kai and various warlords to step into the breach. The history of China from the Boxer Rebellion to Mao's triumph in 1949 was a laboratory for questions of 4GW, state-building, state failure, foreign intervention, guerilla warfare theory, counterinsurgency and many of the issues with which statesmen and military commanders are wrestling with in Iraq.
Shane and Curtis at Dreaming5GW - "5GW in Clausewitz’s Trinity" and "John Robb: “On Open Source Guerrilla Vanguards”
Respectively, Shane is expanding on the exchange here over Fabius Maximus and Curtis delves into the above post by John. Speaking as a historian, what we know about about Soviet and American decision-making during the Cuban missile crisis offers a serious caution regarding game theory assumptions of rationality. Excomm was an exercise in attempting rationality but the "fog of war" was so dangerously opaque as to render such intentions almost moot. The problem of information was redoubled on the Soviet side due to the nature of the Soviet system and Khrushchev's political conflicts within the Presidium
Dave at The Glittering Eye - "Obama’s Proposal to Break the Impasse on Iran (Updated)"
Dave gives his trademark serious evaluation to Senator Obama's proposal to give a presidential-level investment in diplomatic talks with Iran and he's right about Obama's monocausal explanation of Iranian behavior.
While I am in favor of serious diplomatic negotiations withIran, I'm not crazy about a foreign policy neophyte like Obama a) taking a personal, presidential, lead in negotiating strategy - that's what the secretary of state is for when the president is green; and b) staking a brand-new administration's prestige on the outcome of negotiations with as difficult and hostile a diplomatic adversary as the Iranians. We don't need to unilaterally ratchet up the pressure on ourselves for a deal when enough real-world, strategic concerns abound.
Dan of tdaxp - "Automaticity (Automation of Schemata)"
Dan's research is investigating a crucial cognitive process, one without which we'd have been hard-pressed to have gotten out of the stone age.
Shlok has been published in Pragati: The Indian National Interest Review with an article on Naxalite Rage ( no link). Congrats, Shlok !!
CKR - "The Strategery Article"
Cheryl Rofer identifies strategic paralysis at the heart of the Bush administration, for which she blames the president. I agree, though for different reasons. One reason would be the self-crippling, insularity of the information-flow around Mr. Bush and his key advisers (which ultimately, is also Bush's fault. A president pretty much gets the national security process he really wants to have). Only part of this distortion is ideological, much of it is court politics to keep control of the king's ear, so to speak. Hadley's origins as a national security expert, for example, were in the Kissingerian-dominated Ford administration, yet he reputedly leads the pack to "shoot the messenger" on Iraq, among the inner circle.
That's it!
Sunday, Sunday, Sunday...where blog reaction is the attraction!
Sean Meade - "Catch-22"
Sean puts away his proofreader's blue pencil and dons the Hat of Literary Criticism to make an (accurate) point about generational zeitgeist.
Global Guerillas - "ON OPEN SOURCE GUERRILLA VANGUARDS"
Great theory post by John Robb. I'd say that the Maoists exploited a latent crisis of legitimacy rather than created one "ex nihilo". Both the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang were a reaction against the collapse of the Q'ing and the inability Yuan Shih-kai and various warlords to step into the breach. The history of China from the Boxer Rebellion to Mao's triumph in 1949 was a laboratory for questions of 4GW, state-building, state failure, foreign intervention, guerilla warfare theory, counterinsurgency and many of the issues with which statesmen and military commanders are wrestling with in Iraq.
Shane and Curtis at Dreaming5GW - "5GW in Clausewitz’s Trinity" and "John Robb: “On Open Source Guerrilla Vanguards”
Respectively, Shane is expanding on the exchange here over Fabius Maximus and Curtis delves into the above post by John. Speaking as a historian, what we know about about Soviet and American decision-making during the Cuban missile crisis offers a serious caution regarding game theory assumptions of rationality. Excomm was an exercise in attempting rationality but the "fog of war" was so dangerously opaque as to render such intentions almost moot. The problem of information was redoubled on the Soviet side due to the nature of the Soviet system and Khrushchev's political conflicts within the Presidium
Dave at The Glittering Eye - "Obama’s Proposal to Break the Impasse on Iran (Updated)"
Dave gives his trademark serious evaluation to Senator Obama's proposal to give a presidential-level investment in diplomatic talks with Iran and he's right about Obama's monocausal explanation of Iranian behavior.
While I am in favor of serious diplomatic negotiations withIran, I'm not crazy about a foreign policy neophyte like Obama a) taking a personal, presidential, lead in negotiating strategy - that's what the secretary of state is for when the president is green; and b) staking a brand-new administration's prestige on the outcome of negotiations with as difficult and hostile a diplomatic adversary as the Iranians. We don't need to unilaterally ratchet up the pressure on ourselves for a deal when enough real-world, strategic concerns abound.
Dan of tdaxp - "Automaticity (Automation of Schemata)"
Dan's research is investigating a crucial cognitive process, one without which we'd have been hard-pressed to have gotten out of the stone age.
Shlok has been published in Pragati: The Indian National Interest Review with an article on Naxalite Rage ( no link). Congrats, Shlok !!
CKR - "The Strategery Article"
Cheryl Rofer identifies strategic paralysis at the heart of the Bush administration, for which she blames the president. I agree, though for different reasons. One reason would be the self-crippling, insularity of the information-flow around Mr. Bush and his key advisers (which ultimately, is also Bush's fault. A president pretty much gets the national security process he really wants to have). Only part of this distortion is ideological, much of it is court politics to keep control of the king's ear, so to speak. Hadley's origins as a national security expert, for example, were in the Kissingerian-dominated Ford administration, yet he reputedly leads the pack to "shoot the messenger" on Iraq, among the inner circle.
That's it!
Labels: recommended reading
¶ 6:49 AM
Comments:
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Shlok Vaidya's Naxalite Rage article begins half way down page 9 of Pragati, and the entire issue can be downloaded in .pdf here.
# posted by 
: Sunday, 04 November, 2007
: Sunday, 04 November, 2007
Thanks for the recognition.
Court politics is always there. Bush's weaknesses, his moralism above strategy, amplify it.
CKR
Court politics is always there. Bush's weaknesses, his moralism above strategy, amplify it.
CKR
# posted by : Sunday, 04 November, 2007
: Sunday, 04 November, 2007
Um, and it's really Michael Mazarr who put it all together so nicely.
CKR
CKR
# posted by : Sunday, 04 November, 2007
: Sunday, 04 November, 2007
Mark,
With your prodding, I've been led to ask whether "fog of war" and "open souce [guerrillas/war]" are compatible terms. Previously, I've used the general and vague term static to suggest that they are, limiting the scope of any sort of open source-enabled activity; but I wonder if everyone else using the idea of open source warfare has made that leap.
With your prodding, I've been led to ask whether "fog of war" and "open souce [guerrillas/war]" are compatible terms. Previously, I've used the general and vague term static to suggest that they are, limiting the scope of any sort of open source-enabled activity; but I wonder if everyone else using the idea of open source warfare has made that leap.
Hi Charles,
Much thanks - I was posting at light speed on Sunday morning.
Hi Cheryl,
I should have identified/differentiated Mazarr. I can only plead undue haste in trying to get at least some post up last weekend.
Regarding court politics: Yes, that is always with us but the Bush administration stands out for self-imposed isolation like few others. Compared to Bush II., the Nixon White House had a revolving door on the Oval Office.
Despite his paranoid insecurities and dark grudges, Nixon forced himself to engage with a range of people and reflected on what they said, even if only to disparage them, that analytical mind was working. I get no sense that outside views, even conservative ones, penetrate the "bubble" to be considered at all.
Curtis,
I view " fog of war" as the degree of uncertainty present in a scenario of conflict and a variable that can be reduced or increased depending on the interactions of the belligerents and/or third parties.
"Open-Source warfare" is not the same thing, IMHO, but as a modality it would increase the level of uncertainty present compared to, say 2GW which was more predictable.
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Much thanks - I was posting at light speed on Sunday morning.
Hi Cheryl,
I should have identified/differentiated Mazarr. I can only plead undue haste in trying to get at least some post up last weekend.
Regarding court politics: Yes, that is always with us but the Bush administration stands out for self-imposed isolation like few others. Compared to Bush II., the Nixon White House had a revolving door on the Oval Office.
Despite his paranoid insecurities and dark grudges, Nixon forced himself to engage with a range of people and reflected on what they said, even if only to disparage them, that analytical mind was working. I get no sense that outside views, even conservative ones, penetrate the "bubble" to be considered at all.
Curtis,
I view " fog of war" as the degree of uncertainty present in a scenario of conflict and a variable that can be reduced or increased depending on the interactions of the belligerents and/or third parties.
"Open-Source warfare" is not the same thing, IMHO, but as a modality it would increase the level of uncertainty present compared to, say 2GW which was more predictable.
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