Friday, January 26, 2007
STATE FAILURE 2.0
(Cross-posted at Chicago Boyz)
One of the sharpest points of contention between Thoms P.M. Barnett and John Robb is over the feasibility of Tom's System Administration concept. This issue has been the topic of numerous posts and the occasional rhetorical jab between the two strategic theorists. This pattern repeats itself, in my view, for a number of reasons. First, even friendly professional rivalry causes a natural bumping of heads; secondly, Robb looks at a system and thinks how it can be made to fall apart while Barnett looks at the same system and imagines how the pieces can be reintegrated. Third, no one really has all the answers yet on why some states fail relatively easily while others prove resilient in the face of horrific stress.
Robb contends that Global Guerillas can potentially keep a state in permanent failure, despite the best efforts of System Administration intervention to the contrary. A new level of systemic collapse, call it State Failure 2.0, where failure constitutes a self-sustaining dynamic. Broadly defined, you would chalk up " wins" for Robb's point of view in Somalia, Iraq and the Congo. In Dr. Barnett's column you would find Germany, Japan, Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone in evidence for the efficacy of Sys Admin work. Lebanon and Afghanistan perhaps could be described as a nation-building draw at this point in time.
Why permanent failure in some cases but not others ? This is something that long puzzled me. Then today, I read an intriguing pair of posts at Paul Hartzog's blog - " Ernesto Laclau and the Persistence of Panarchy" and " Complexity and Collapse". An excerpt from the first post:
"Ernesto Laclau was here @ UMich and gave a delightful talk that gave me some key insights into the long-term stability of panarchy.
...However, with the new heterogeneity of global social movements, Laclau makes the point that as the state-system declines, there is no possibility of the emergence of a new state-like form because the diverse multitude possesses no single criterion of difference around which a new state could crystallize.
Thus, there is no possibility of a state which could satisfy the heterogenous values of the diverse multitude. What is significant here is that according to this logic, once panarchy arrives, it can never coalesce into some new stable unified entity.
In other words, panarchy is autopoietic as is. As new criteria of difference emerge and vanish, the complex un-whole that is panarchy will never rigidify into something that can be opposed, i.e. it will never become a new hegemony. "
While I think Paul is incorrect on the ultimate conclusion - that panarchy is a steady-state system for society - I think he has accurately described why a state may remain " stuck" in failure for a considerable period of time as we reckon it. Moreover, it was a familiar scenario to me, being reminiscient of the permanent failure experienced by the global economy during the Great Depression. Yet some states pulled themselves out of the Depression, locally and temporarily, with extreme state intervention while the system itself did not recover until after WWII with the opposite policy - steady liberalization of international trade and de-regulation of markets that became globalization.
The lesson from that economic analogy might be that reviving completely failed states might first require a " clearing of the board" of local opposition - defeated Germany and Japan, Cambodia, Sierra Leone and East Timor were completely devastated countries that had to begin societal reconstruction at only slightly better than ground zero. Somalia, Afghanistan, Congo, Iraq, and Lebanon all contain robust subnational networks that create high levels of friction that work against System Administration. At times, international aid simply helps sustain the dysfunctional actors in their resistance.
System Administration as a cure for helping connect Gap states might be akin to government fiscal and monetary policy intervention in the economy; it may work best with the easiest and worst-off cases where there is either a functional and legitimate local government to act as a partner or where there is no government to get in the way and the warring factions are exhausted.
The dangerous middle ground of partially failed states is the real sticking point.
(Cross-posted at Chicago Boyz)
One of the sharpest points of contention between Thoms P.M. Barnett and John Robb is over the feasibility of Tom's System Administration concept. This issue has been the topic of numerous posts and the occasional rhetorical jab between the two strategic theorists. This pattern repeats itself, in my view, for a number of reasons. First, even friendly professional rivalry causes a natural bumping of heads; secondly, Robb looks at a system and thinks how it can be made to fall apart while Barnett looks at the same system and imagines how the pieces can be reintegrated. Third, no one really has all the answers yet on why some states fail relatively easily while others prove resilient in the face of horrific stress.
Robb contends that Global Guerillas can potentially keep a state in permanent failure, despite the best efforts of System Administration intervention to the contrary. A new level of systemic collapse, call it State Failure 2.0, where failure constitutes a self-sustaining dynamic. Broadly defined, you would chalk up " wins" for Robb's point of view in Somalia, Iraq and the Congo. In Dr. Barnett's column you would find Germany, Japan, Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone in evidence for the efficacy of Sys Admin work. Lebanon and Afghanistan perhaps could be described as a nation-building draw at this point in time.
Why permanent failure in some cases but not others ? This is something that long puzzled me. Then today, I read an intriguing pair of posts at Paul Hartzog's blog - " Ernesto Laclau and the Persistence of Panarchy" and " Complexity and Collapse". An excerpt from the first post:
"Ernesto Laclau was here @ UMich and gave a delightful talk that gave me some key insights into the long-term stability of panarchy.
...However, with the new heterogeneity of global social movements, Laclau makes the point that as the state-system declines, there is no possibility of the emergence of a new state-like form because the diverse multitude possesses no single criterion of difference around which a new state could crystallize.
Thus, there is no possibility of a state which could satisfy the heterogenous values of the diverse multitude. What is significant here is that according to this logic, once panarchy arrives, it can never coalesce into some new stable unified entity.
In other words, panarchy is autopoietic as is. As new criteria of difference emerge and vanish, the complex un-whole that is panarchy will never rigidify into something that can be opposed, i.e. it will never become a new hegemony. "
While I think Paul is incorrect on the ultimate conclusion - that panarchy is a steady-state system for society - I think he has accurately described why a state may remain " stuck" in failure for a considerable period of time as we reckon it. Moreover, it was a familiar scenario to me, being reminiscient of the permanent failure experienced by the global economy during the Great Depression. Yet some states pulled themselves out of the Depression, locally and temporarily, with extreme state intervention while the system itself did not recover until after WWII with the opposite policy - steady liberalization of international trade and de-regulation of markets that became globalization.
The lesson from that economic analogy might be that reviving completely failed states might first require a " clearing of the board" of local opposition - defeated Germany and Japan, Cambodia, Sierra Leone and East Timor were completely devastated countries that had to begin societal reconstruction at only slightly better than ground zero. Somalia, Afghanistan, Congo, Iraq, and Lebanon all contain robust subnational networks that create high levels of friction that work against System Administration. At times, international aid simply helps sustain the dysfunctional actors in their resistance.
System Administration as a cure for helping connect Gap states might be akin to government fiscal and monetary policy intervention in the economy; it may work best with the easiest and worst-off cases where there is either a functional and legitimate local government to act as a partner or where there is no government to get in the way and the warring factions are exhausted.
The dangerous middle ground of partially failed states is the real sticking point.
Labels: analogy, barnett, complexity, globalguerillas, hartzog, natiuon-building, networks, panarchy, robb, state building, state failure, system administration, theory
¶ 9:19 PM
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(Cross posted at Chicago Boys).
The lesson from that economic analogy might be that reviving completely failed states might first require a " clearing of the board" of local opposition - defeated Germany and Japan, Cambodia, Sierra Leone and East Timor were completely devastated countries that had to begin societal reconstruction at only slightly better than ground zero. Somalia, Afghanistan, Congo, Iraq, and Lebanon all contain robust subnational networks that create high levels of friction that work against System Administration. At times, international aid simply helps sustain the dysfunctional actors in their resistance.
This reminds me of some old posts on lakotization / family liberation. The US Army successfully used the same strategy in the northern plain: disrupt the cultures of rebel tribes such that they were unable to oppose US operations.
The lesson from that economic analogy might be that reviving completely failed states might first require a " clearing of the board" of local opposition - defeated Germany and Japan, Cambodia, Sierra Leone and East Timor were completely devastated countries that had to begin societal reconstruction at only slightly better than ground zero. Somalia, Afghanistan, Congo, Iraq, and Lebanon all contain robust subnational networks that create high levels of friction that work against System Administration. At times, international aid simply helps sustain the dysfunctional actors in their resistance.
This reminds me of some old posts on lakotization / family liberation. The US Army successfully used the same strategy in the northern plain: disrupt the cultures of rebel tribes such that they were unable to oppose US operations.
I agree. Similar principle, different scale - doesn't even have to be intentional but atomization seems to facilitate connecting up.
Of course on the other end, you have a mostly functional state being helped pro-actively before disruptive elements gain momentum
Of course on the other end, you have a mostly functional state being helped pro-actively before disruptive elements gain momentum
LOL! Dan can speak for himself butI've been married twice lester, finding enough women to talk to ain't my problem ;o)
I just don't talk about strategic military theory with most of them. Tends not to be the best icebreaker at parties.
I just don't talk about strategic military theory with most of them. Tends not to be the best icebreaker at parties.
Your description of the dangerous middle ground is spot-on and illumanating as a framework to view the challenges states face recovering from civil war and kleptocracy.
In your example states, East Timor is another example of the international aid community prolonging or even worsening an existing conflict, in this case the power struggle between ethnic soldiers and authority figures from the east and western regions of the country.
Re: Belief in the recovery of Sierra Leone on a SysAdmin model, like Liberia, has to be taken with a serious grain of salt because of the continuing troubles in Nigeria and the destabilizing effect they have on long-term development and trade in West Africa in general. As the Nigerian crises worsen, as they likely will with no-qualms Chinese security and weapons assistance, its doubtful progress in the two nations would survive the violent decline of the Nigerian empire-state.
Cambodia, which Chevron has now claimed has a vast array of oil reserves (pending further explanation and details in March-May), is little more than a kleptocracy only marginally better off than more chaotic vampire states like Burma and the Congo. Its environment upon which much of the nation's economy and livliehood is still much dependent upon is being ravaged by corrupt government officials, organized crime and business officials, clearcutting their way towards ecocide. The oil curse may only seal their destitution.
If it seems I'm making mountains out of molehills, I apologize, but its a sad testament to the sheer enormity of the challenges the SysAdmin model faces and the daunting gap between rhetoric and reality. Perhaps the only true successes of the model in the past 20 years have been Mozambique (which is a unique case largely influenced by local developments and South Africa's economic imperialism), Kurdish Iraq, Bosnia and Kosovo. Rwanda is in its own bracket because of the genocide and the RPF.
In your example states, East Timor is another example of the international aid community prolonging or even worsening an existing conflict, in this case the power struggle between ethnic soldiers and authority figures from the east and western regions of the country.
Re: Belief in the recovery of Sierra Leone on a SysAdmin model, like Liberia, has to be taken with a serious grain of salt because of the continuing troubles in Nigeria and the destabilizing effect they have on long-term development and trade in West Africa in general. As the Nigerian crises worsen, as they likely will with no-qualms Chinese security and weapons assistance, its doubtful progress in the two nations would survive the violent decline of the Nigerian empire-state.
Cambodia, which Chevron has now claimed has a vast array of oil reserves (pending further explanation and details in March-May), is little more than a kleptocracy only marginally better off than more chaotic vampire states like Burma and the Congo. Its environment upon which much of the nation's economy and livliehood is still much dependent upon is being ravaged by corrupt government officials, organized crime and business officials, clearcutting their way towards ecocide. The oil curse may only seal their destitution.
If it seems I'm making mountains out of molehills, I apologize, but its a sad testament to the sheer enormity of the challenges the SysAdmin model faces and the daunting gap between rhetoric and reality. Perhaps the only true successes of the model in the past 20 years have been Mozambique (which is a unique case largely influenced by local developments and South Africa's economic imperialism), Kurdish Iraq, Bosnia and Kosovo. Rwanda is in its own bracket because of the genocide and the RPF.
# posted by 
: Saturday, 27 January, 2007
: Saturday, 27 January, 2007
Hi Mark,
I think Eddie has put some needed reality into this discussion of failed states. While I don't know as much about the situation in Cambodia and Sierra Leone, I do know about East Timor, and it is about as far from a victory for the "sysadmin" as you can get short of all-out war.
I suppose being completely devastated and having to start over might produce some political stability, but this is not the case for East Timor, which throws some doubt on your hypothesis. Timor was thoroughly defeated in conventional terms in 1975, yet the insurgency lasted nearly 25 years despite massacres, reprisals, high-tech equipment and population transfer. It was a clear victory for 4GW Timor's infrastructure was afterwards wiped out by militia attacks, but I think the effect of that is deceptive in terms of stability - the poverty and lack of infrastructure means infighting is less effective and less deadly. But the government, rebels and gangs face that problem equally, and all have difficulties in using force as a result, and none of them want to kick out the peacekeepers.
East Timor today is incredibly poor, unstable, rebels and gangs operate freely, and the government is torn by infighting between ex-rebels and ex-collaborators (not to mention, different tribes). The only reason it looks like a success is because foreign forces restrain the worst of the violence, and the poverty and lack of infrastructure limits the successful mobilisation of large numbers on any side. It's certainly not a reason to be optimistic about nation-building, even though it is an example of relatively successful foreign intervention.
I think Eddie has put some needed reality into this discussion of failed states. While I don't know as much about the situation in Cambodia and Sierra Leone, I do know about East Timor, and it is about as far from a victory for the "sysadmin" as you can get short of all-out war.
I suppose being completely devastated and having to start over might produce some political stability, but this is not the case for East Timor, which throws some doubt on your hypothesis. Timor was thoroughly defeated in conventional terms in 1975, yet the insurgency lasted nearly 25 years despite massacres, reprisals, high-tech equipment and population transfer. It was a clear victory for 4GW Timor's infrastructure was afterwards wiped out by militia attacks, but I think the effect of that is deceptive in terms of stability - the poverty and lack of infrastructure means infighting is less effective and less deadly. But the government, rebels and gangs face that problem equally, and all have difficulties in using force as a result, and none of them want to kick out the peacekeepers.
East Timor today is incredibly poor, unstable, rebels and gangs operate freely, and the government is torn by infighting between ex-rebels and ex-collaborators (not to mention, different tribes). The only reason it looks like a success is because foreign forces restrain the worst of the violence, and the poverty and lack of infrastructure limits the successful mobilisation of large numbers on any side. It's certainly not a reason to be optimistic about nation-building, even though it is an example of relatively successful foreign intervention.
# posted by : Sunday, 28 January, 2007
: Sunday, 28 January, 2007
eddie and empire,
I appreciate the unvarnished criticisms of my weaker " case study" examples ( nor had I, for that matter, considered Mozambique or Rwanda at all). You have pointed out superb caveats that can't be ignored if our efforts are to improve in future cases.
Looking at these states for "lessons learned" is vital as Sys Admin does face a terribly complex task; but the alternatives of doing nothing with crisis failed states have proven morally unpalatable and politically, intervention sometimes is driven anyway (Bosnia, Timor,Somalia) despite policy makers attempting to hew a non-interventionist course.
I appreciate the unvarnished criticisms of my weaker " case study" examples ( nor had I, for that matter, considered Mozambique or Rwanda at all). You have pointed out superb caveats that can't be ignored if our efforts are to improve in future cases.
Looking at these states for "lessons learned" is vital as Sys Admin does face a terribly complex task; but the alternatives of doing nothing with crisis failed states have proven morally unpalatable and politically, intervention sometimes is driven anyway (Bosnia, Timor,Somalia) despite policy makers attempting to hew a non-interventionist course.
Mark,
Reading this, I was reminded of Hobbes’ state of nature. It seems, that what you are basically saying is that the state of nature, which is described by Hobbes as nasty, brutish and short, is man’s natural state. At least, in my way of thinking, until men grow weary or exhausted with war, and then and only then allow the SysAdmin to work. That is, state failure is basically men returning to their natural state, where they basically must re-bargain, and re-align that which allowed for the creation of the state in the first place, until they reach a point where they are either so exhausted by war that they choose once again to re-craft a social contract for that state or to disband it altogether and create alternate legitimacy structures.
In our current world, a few states can fall back into the natural state, but there are others such as the US who can wield both a Leviathan force, as well as a SysAdmin force to bring these states back. However, from what I understand you to say, this means that the US cannot do this, until “a clearing of the board” has taken place, or the way I interpret it, until these alternate loyalties (clans, tribes, etc) become so destroyed or exhausted that they allow the SysAdmin to work. Absent that, we may employ a SysAdmin, without achieving any lasting change or improvement in the situation.
This argument gets even thornier once we consider that most of the states we are dealing with are former colonies of Western powers which for the most part, carved them up to suit the colonial power’s interests and without paying heed to the absence of historical bonds between the people united under these new nation-states. Hence, the Cold War acted as a sort of time-freeze for the reordering that needed to occur following the end of colonialism because it pitted the US against the Soviet Union and in that conflict, you were either with one, or with the other. The system, although allowing some corrections, essentially was frozen until the end of the Cold War. It was at this point that the peoples under the old colonial boundaries could challenge the system imposed on them by their old colonial masters. Because the US is the guarantor of that system (post-WWII, post-Cold War), anti-americanism comes naturally. Normally, the US without an existential threat would try to let these wars burn, until that time when the parties involved exhausted by war no longer had an option but to either cooperate with one another in a new state, or agree to separate, such as the former Yugoslavia.
That, however, is not the case. Thanks to Islamism (which takes this anti-system, anti-American opposition to a new level) the US is faced with an existential threat, once which we must confront and defeat. The danger in this, however, lies in viewing every conflict (particularly in Africa, and the wider Muslim world) solely through the lens of the GWOT without understanding the natural re-aligning that must occur within these regions to right the wrongs of the colonial past.
Following that logic, it is easier to see how the big bang was supposed to work. Mainly, by creating such chaos that the re-alignment was jump started by American actions, but not controlled by America, and that is the mistake the administration (and many of us) made. The President was right when he said that change needed to come to the region, and he began it, but we could not control it (as the administration tried to do) at best, we could simply guide it, and that is where we failed.
Getting back to the original subject of the piece, this also demonstrates (again, following the logic of the argument) that Barnett’s SysAdmin cannot work even when we go into one of these situations (state-failures) until such time as the parties doing the fighting become exhausted, or one side is defeated. Given that because of the GWOT we will feel a need to get involved (because global guerrillas naturally seek these as bases of operations), we risk both exacerbating the situation, and strengthening the push to overthrow the very system we are trying to protect. This, I guess would be the dangerous middle-ground you describe in your post.
Well, at least this is where my thoughts led me after reading your post. If you think I’m missing something, please feel free to point it out.
Reading this, I was reminded of Hobbes’ state of nature. It seems, that what you are basically saying is that the state of nature, which is described by Hobbes as nasty, brutish and short, is man’s natural state. At least, in my way of thinking, until men grow weary or exhausted with war, and then and only then allow the SysAdmin to work. That is, state failure is basically men returning to their natural state, where they basically must re-bargain, and re-align that which allowed for the creation of the state in the first place, until they reach a point where they are either so exhausted by war that they choose once again to re-craft a social contract for that state or to disband it altogether and create alternate legitimacy structures.
In our current world, a few states can fall back into the natural state, but there are others such as the US who can wield both a Leviathan force, as well as a SysAdmin force to bring these states back. However, from what I understand you to say, this means that the US cannot do this, until “a clearing of the board” has taken place, or the way I interpret it, until these alternate loyalties (clans, tribes, etc) become so destroyed or exhausted that they allow the SysAdmin to work. Absent that, we may employ a SysAdmin, without achieving any lasting change or improvement in the situation.
This argument gets even thornier once we consider that most of the states we are dealing with are former colonies of Western powers which for the most part, carved them up to suit the colonial power’s interests and without paying heed to the absence of historical bonds between the people united under these new nation-states. Hence, the Cold War acted as a sort of time-freeze for the reordering that needed to occur following the end of colonialism because it pitted the US against the Soviet Union and in that conflict, you were either with one, or with the other. The system, although allowing some corrections, essentially was frozen until the end of the Cold War. It was at this point that the peoples under the old colonial boundaries could challenge the system imposed on them by their old colonial masters. Because the US is the guarantor of that system (post-WWII, post-Cold War), anti-americanism comes naturally. Normally, the US without an existential threat would try to let these wars burn, until that time when the parties involved exhausted by war no longer had an option but to either cooperate with one another in a new state, or agree to separate, such as the former Yugoslavia.
That, however, is not the case. Thanks to Islamism (which takes this anti-system, anti-American opposition to a new level) the US is faced with an existential threat, once which we must confront and defeat. The danger in this, however, lies in viewing every conflict (particularly in Africa, and the wider Muslim world) solely through the lens of the GWOT without understanding the natural re-aligning that must occur within these regions to right the wrongs of the colonial past.
Following that logic, it is easier to see how the big bang was supposed to work. Mainly, by creating such chaos that the re-alignment was jump started by American actions, but not controlled by America, and that is the mistake the administration (and many of us) made. The President was right when he said that change needed to come to the region, and he began it, but we could not control it (as the administration tried to do) at best, we could simply guide it, and that is where we failed.
Getting back to the original subject of the piece, this also demonstrates (again, following the logic of the argument) that Barnett’s SysAdmin cannot work even when we go into one of these situations (state-failures) until such time as the parties doing the fighting become exhausted, or one side is defeated. Given that because of the GWOT we will feel a need to get involved (because global guerrillas naturally seek these as bases of operations), we risk both exacerbating the situation, and strengthening the push to overthrow the very system we are trying to protect. This, I guess would be the dangerous middle-ground you describe in your post.
Well, at least this is where my thoughts led me after reading your post. If you think I’m missing something, please feel free to point it out.
# posted by : Monday, 29 January, 2007
: Monday, 29 January, 2007
Anon wrote:
"That is, state failure is basically men returning to their natural state, where they basically must re-bargain, and re-align that which allowed for the creation of the state in the first place, until they reach a point where they are either so exhausted by war that they choose once again to re-craft a social contract for that state or to disband it altogether and create alternate legitimacy structures."
That would be a good characterization, yes. State failure 2.0 would be having the additional problem of negative dynamics - a scale-free network of paramilitaries for example - preventing the new social contract from being written.
The other end of the spectrum you might call preemptive Sys admin, innoculating basically functional but at-risk states with Core connectivity and support before the descending spiral can gain momentum
I think your description of this problem as " thorny" hits the mark.
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"That is, state failure is basically men returning to their natural state, where they basically must re-bargain, and re-align that which allowed for the creation of the state in the first place, until they reach a point where they are either so exhausted by war that they choose once again to re-craft a social contract for that state or to disband it altogether and create alternate legitimacy structures."
That would be a good characterization, yes. State failure 2.0 would be having the additional problem of negative dynamics - a scale-free network of paramilitaries for example - preventing the new social contract from being written.
The other end of the spectrum you might call preemptive Sys admin, innoculating basically functional but at-risk states with Core connectivity and support before the descending spiral can gain momentum
I think your description of this problem as " thorny" hits the mark.
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