Tuesday, May 22, 2007
FABIUS MAXIMUS ON THE GENERALS
Fabius Maximus critiques American generalship in his trademark style:
"The Core Competence of America’s Military LeadersThird in a series about a serious threat to America"
There's a number of provocative arguments in FM's latest piece but I wanted to highlight this one in particular:
"The events surrounding the fall of Iraq’s capital are difficult to imagine, even after four years have passed. US forces again proved invincible on the field of battle. They rolled up to Baghdad, occupied it and waited for orders. Then the capitol fell into disorder, with looting and burning of key infrastructure.
Apparently the Pentagon’s senior generals – the best-educated generals ever to lead an Army – failed to prepare for one of history’s most common scenarios. As a result they read reports from their field commanders and watched as victory tipped over to what might become a crushing defeat. Perhaps for the next war our top generals’ briefing books should include DVD’s of War and Peace and Gone with the Wind. Watching the burning of Moscow and Atlanta might remind them to plan for this contingency.
It’s not yet clear why and how this occurred, except in one respect. Our military is a full member of 21st Century American society – no separate military culture here – and its top leaders produce excuses suitable for a Superpower, featuring the new American mantra: “It’s not our fault.” An expert at RAND said it well:
While it can be argued that U.S. military planners could not have been expected to anticipate the emergence of an insurgency any more than they could have foreseen the widespread disorders, looting, and random violence that followed the fall of Baghdad, that is precisely the nub of the problem. The fact that military planners apparently didn’t consider the possibility that sustained and organized resistance could gather momentum and transform itself into an insurgency reflects a pathology that has long affected governments and militaries everywhere…
Bruce Hoffman, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq”, RAND (2004)
RAND’s sponsors likely appreciated the diplomatic phrasing “while it can be argued”. Much nicer than suggesting that our generals should have foreseen the scenario that has dominated post-WW-II wars, guerrilla warfare against foreign occupiers."
In the article, FM refers to American generals as being akin to corporate CEO's. The personnel system of the U.S. military, in which zero defects and lavish ( bordering upon ludicrous) praise from your immediate superior is necessary for promotion under an "up or out" system, weeds out creative and divergent thinkers, candid speakers, risk-takers and even mild non-conformists. What is left is a finely honed and homogenous administrative class attuned to institutional norms and a received professional culture. A system that creates a surplus of first-rate political generals like Al Haig and Colin Powell but not Pattons, Grants or Lees. A few slip through, but how many ? And of these few, how many will have a chance at field command ?
Incentives must be geared to promote those who exhibit behaviors that tend to win wars on the battlefield rather than bureaucratic skirmishes in Washington.
Fabius Maximus critiques American generalship in his trademark style:
"The Core Competence of America’s Military LeadersThird in a series about a serious threat to America"
There's a number of provocative arguments in FM's latest piece but I wanted to highlight this one in particular:
"The events surrounding the fall of Iraq’s capital are difficult to imagine, even after four years have passed. US forces again proved invincible on the field of battle. They rolled up to Baghdad, occupied it and waited for orders. Then the capitol fell into disorder, with looting and burning of key infrastructure.
Apparently the Pentagon’s senior generals – the best-educated generals ever to lead an Army – failed to prepare for one of history’s most common scenarios. As a result they read reports from their field commanders and watched as victory tipped over to what might become a crushing defeat. Perhaps for the next war our top generals’ briefing books should include DVD’s of War and Peace and Gone with the Wind. Watching the burning of Moscow and Atlanta might remind them to plan for this contingency.
It’s not yet clear why and how this occurred, except in one respect. Our military is a full member of 21st Century American society – no separate military culture here – and its top leaders produce excuses suitable for a Superpower, featuring the new American mantra: “It’s not our fault.” An expert at RAND said it well:
While it can be argued that U.S. military planners could not have been expected to anticipate the emergence of an insurgency any more than they could have foreseen the widespread disorders, looting, and random violence that followed the fall of Baghdad, that is precisely the nub of the problem. The fact that military planners apparently didn’t consider the possibility that sustained and organized resistance could gather momentum and transform itself into an insurgency reflects a pathology that has long affected governments and militaries everywhere…
Bruce Hoffman, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq”, RAND (2004)
RAND’s sponsors likely appreciated the diplomatic phrasing “while it can be argued”. Much nicer than suggesting that our generals should have foreseen the scenario that has dominated post-WW-II wars, guerrilla warfare against foreign occupiers."
In the article, FM refers to American generals as being akin to corporate CEO's. The personnel system of the U.S. military, in which zero defects and lavish ( bordering upon ludicrous) praise from your immediate superior is necessary for promotion under an "up or out" system, weeds out creative and divergent thinkers, candid speakers, risk-takers and even mild non-conformists. What is left is a finely honed and homogenous administrative class attuned to institutional norms and a received professional culture. A system that creates a surplus of first-rate political generals like Al Haig and Colin Powell but not Pattons, Grants or Lees. A few slip through, but how many ? And of these few, how many will have a chance at field command ?
Incentives must be geared to promote those who exhibit behaviors that tend to win wars on the battlefield rather than bureaucratic skirmishes in Washington.
Labels: defen, dni, fabius maximus, military, military reform, war, warriors
¶ 7:31 PM
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Nice summary of the problem. You said that better than I did!
Now if only someone can develop a solution...
Now if only someone can develop a solution...
Some critics believe the above are examples not of our senior generals’ incompetence, but of obedience to their civilian superiors’ orders about the conduct of the war. That is, these critics accuse them of moral cowardice – putting their careers above the attainment of victory, with the lives of our troops squandered due to errors of omission and execution. Such issues are beyond the scope of this article.
I think this criticism is correct in some cases, but more commonly, the senior brass delude themselves into thinking that doing what's best for their career, agreeing with the civilian leadership on war aims and means, just happens to be militarily wise. Call it incompetence plus.
Since fabius cites Hackworth, consider what he wrote in About Face. The book is littered with examples of people rationalizing away the evidence of their own experiences in Vietnam. Hackworth himself got chased out of the service for breaking the taboo on speaking up.
You know, really, if the problem is that the brass should have "stood in the door" over Iraq - over how to fight it or whether to fight it, depending on your politics - will people draw the appropriate lessons? Did they after Vietnam? The way I see it, they absorbed the wrong message - PR, embeds, message control.
-Mithras
I think this criticism is correct in some cases, but more commonly, the senior brass delude themselves into thinking that doing what's best for their career, agreeing with the civilian leadership on war aims and means, just happens to be militarily wise. Call it incompetence plus.
Since fabius cites Hackworth, consider what he wrote in About Face. The book is littered with examples of people rationalizing away the evidence of their own experiences in Vietnam. Hackworth himself got chased out of the service for breaking the taboo on speaking up.
You know, really, if the problem is that the brass should have "stood in the door" over Iraq - over how to fight it or whether to fight it, depending on your politics - will people draw the appropriate lessons? Did they after Vietnam? The way I see it, they absorbed the wrong message - PR, embeds, message control.
-Mithras
"FM refers to American generals as being akin to corporate CEO's. The personnel system of the U.S. military, in which zero defects and lavish ( bordering upon ludicrous) praise from your immediate superior is necessary for promotion under an "up or out" system, weeds out creative and divergent thinkers, candid speakers, risk-takers and even mild non-conformists."
The whole damn country is like this.
Businessess that are just starting or have their backs to the wall are the ones that break out of this -- some of the time.
Armies that are staring death and defeat in the face break out of this -- some of the time.
Our military cannot get serious because none of what it does is serious. It is all optional overseas activity that does not rise to the level of an existential threat to the USA. So, it is a matter of moving up the bureaucracy and not upsetting the process and not doing anything that will get you any adverse notice. Currently reading about World War I. Those guys got promoted despite their performance, too.
Some good guys do get through. Petraeus is the real thing. But he is probably too little too late.
I don't see any solution to this problem. It is structural. Maybe, just maybe, very focused attention from the executive branch, and reforms along the lines of Donald Vandegriff's proposals might have some positive impact.
I am very pessimistic.
The whole damn country is like this.
Businessess that are just starting or have their backs to the wall are the ones that break out of this -- some of the time.
Armies that are staring death and defeat in the face break out of this -- some of the time.
Our military cannot get serious because none of what it does is serious. It is all optional overseas activity that does not rise to the level of an existential threat to the USA. So, it is a matter of moving up the bureaucracy and not upsetting the process and not doing anything that will get you any adverse notice. Currently reading about World War I. Those guys got promoted despite their performance, too.
Some good guys do get through. Petraeus is the real thing. But he is probably too little too late.
I don't see any solution to this problem. It is structural. Maybe, just maybe, very focused attention from the executive branch, and reforms along the lines of Donald Vandegriff's proposals might have some positive impact.
I am very pessimistic.
# posted by 
: Wednesday, 23 May, 2007
: Wednesday, 23 May, 2007
Hi FM,
Thanks !
I think the problem stems partly from human nature and partly due to legacy structures. We can at least change the latter, if not the former.
Hi Mithras,
"You know, really, if the problem is that the brass should have "stood in the door" over Iraq - over how to fight it or whether to fight it, depending on your politics - will people draw the appropriate lessons? Did they after Vietnam? The way I see it, they absorbed the wrong message - PR, embeds, message control.
During WWII, General Marshall stood up to Winston Churchill who wanted US forces to invade Crete, a costly operation which would have done little to defeat Nazi Germany but a lot to safeguard postwar British Imperial interests in the Levant.
FDR was wobbly in the face of Churchill's lobbying and Marshall, normally scrupulously correct and formal, got into the British Prime Minister's face and exploded that " No American boy is going to die on that goddamned island!". That was the end of the matter.
The difference is not only one of character, for which Marshall is frequently cited, but of capabilities. Marshall was recognized as a world class strategist, the great logistical wizard of the Allies and an experienced operational planner at the theater level. He spoke with an incontestable authority and Churchill knew it.
Our generals today carry no such weight because the system permits none of them any such depth of experiences as accumulated by Marshall,Patton, Eisenhower, Bradley, MacArthur and others. So even if they get past the institutional reluctance to bring bad news to their civilian superiors, their words lack sufficient gravitas to be a decisive influence.
Hi Lex
"The whole damn country is like this."
yes, I agree. Hierarchies in the industrial age floundering about in the era of the internet and globalization - they are producing dinosaur mentalities in education, the corporate world, the military. Structures need to shift.
Vandergriff is excellent BTW !
Thanks !
I think the problem stems partly from human nature and partly due to legacy structures. We can at least change the latter, if not the former.
Hi Mithras,
"You know, really, if the problem is that the brass should have "stood in the door" over Iraq - over how to fight it or whether to fight it, depending on your politics - will people draw the appropriate lessons? Did they after Vietnam? The way I see it, they absorbed the wrong message - PR, embeds, message control.
During WWII, General Marshall stood up to Winston Churchill who wanted US forces to invade Crete, a costly operation which would have done little to defeat Nazi Germany but a lot to safeguard postwar British Imperial interests in the Levant.
FDR was wobbly in the face of Churchill's lobbying and Marshall, normally scrupulously correct and formal, got into the British Prime Minister's face and exploded that " No American boy is going to die on that goddamned island!". That was the end of the matter.
The difference is not only one of character, for which Marshall is frequently cited, but of capabilities. Marshall was recognized as a world class strategist, the great logistical wizard of the Allies and an experienced operational planner at the theater level. He spoke with an incontestable authority and Churchill knew it.
Our generals today carry no such weight because the system permits none of them any such depth of experiences as accumulated by Marshall,Patton, Eisenhower, Bradley, MacArthur and others. So even if they get past the institutional reluctance to bring bad news to their civilian superiors, their words lack sufficient gravitas to be a decisive influence.
Hi Lex
"The whole damn country is like this."
yes, I agree. Hierarchies in the industrial age floundering about in the era of the internet and globalization - they are producing dinosaur mentalities in education, the corporate world, the military. Structures need to shift.
Vandergriff is excellent BTW !
Good post. Since I know far more "outspoken free-thinkers" who have left the force than been promoted into flag/general officer ranks (Don Vandergriff, John Schmitt, Doug MacGregor), the "zero-defect" mentality and the mandatory hierarchy of promotion even further constrains the talent pool at the top. Corporate boards can go outside the company to hire in CEOs; no such option in the military (where instances of even skipping a single rank -- like Mike Boorda's "two-star time-in-grade" was jokingly referred to as his drive from his Battle Group 1-star command in Norfolk to his 3-star Navy Personnel billet in DC) -- are virtually non-existent today).
Of course, Custer was a "Brevet Major General" (i.e., he wore the stars *and* got the pay) even though his time-in-service rank was a Lt. Colonel at Little Big Horn. So maybe there is something to be said about experience....
The next test in our military will be if COL H.R. McMaster makes Brigadier. If not (or if he opts for the far-better-paying writing and speaking circuit in the 1st CIV DIV), then shame on us.
sf/ shane
Of course, Custer was a "Brevet Major General" (i.e., he wore the stars *and* got the pay) even though his time-in-service rank was a Lt. Colonel at Little Big Horn. So maybe there is something to be said about experience....
The next test in our military will be if COL H.R. McMaster makes Brigadier. If not (or if he opts for the far-better-paying writing and speaking circuit in the 1st CIV DIV), then shame on us.
sf/ shane
"Now if only someone can develop a solution..."
Well, we may have some solace in that this is the first generation of junior/mid-level officers with combat experience and multiple tour to a combat zone. That will over come some of the deficiencies noted. These guys will be better suited for flag rank than the set we have now. The military can capitalize on this by sending these guys to school en masse for post-grad work.
It still does not address the horrid personnel system. Denying promotions based on a bad blurb from your superior on your evaluation is indeed absurd. But more so is the persistent promotion of poor field commanders to staff positions and then battalion level command positions. This needs to stop; you cannot be a flag officer unless you were a successful field commander at some point.
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Well, we may have some solace in that this is the first generation of junior/mid-level officers with combat experience and multiple tour to a combat zone. That will over come some of the deficiencies noted. These guys will be better suited for flag rank than the set we have now. The military can capitalize on this by sending these guys to school en masse for post-grad work.
It still does not address the horrid personnel system. Denying promotions based on a bad blurb from your superior on your evaluation is indeed absurd. But more so is the persistent promotion of poor field commanders to staff positions and then battalion level command positions. This needs to stop; you cannot be a flag officer unless you were a successful field commander at some point.
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