Sunday, July 22, 2007
THE TRIBAL COIN OF THE REALM
[ed. note - entry corrected, my apologies to Colonel McCallister and thanks to Dave for the clarification]
Dave Dilegge, editor of The Small Wars Journal has an excellent post up at The SWJ Blog entitled "COIN in a Tribal Society", relaying the contents of an email from Colonel William (Mac) McCallister (USA Ret.), currently an adivser with II MEF in Iraq. A very rich bibilographic entry, McCallister hits hard at the point of our general failure to communicate our words and deeds in a culturally relevant and comprehensible frame:
"The design and execution of a counterinsurgency campaign in tribal society must reflect the opponent’s cultural realities, his social norms and conventions of war and peacemaking. The fight in Anbar province is a “clash of martial cultures” and reflects two divergent concepts of victory and defeat and “rules of play”. The conventions of war and peace for both sides are based on unique historical and social experience and are expressed in each side’s stylized way of fighting and peacemaking. The central tenet in the design and execution of counterinsurgency operations is that it must take into consideration an opponent’s cultural realities so as to effectively communicate intent.
The study of the “tribal terrain” is a challenge. The reason - comprehensive research materials on Iraqi tribal organization, tribal diplomacy, and the art of tribal war and peacemaking are sparse. The majority of reading materials therefore are general and regional in nature and require “reading between the lines” to gain an appreciation for tribal organizing principles, cultural operating codes, and the tribal art of war and peace. The material is intended to assist the student of the tribal art of war and peace in developing an analytic structure for assessing personal experiences, observations and unit after action reports. The ultimate objective is to assist the warfighter in assessing the effectiveness of counterinsurgency tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and cultural criteria to determine why certain approaches succeed or fail."
I will go one better; the United States government has not come to grips with the need to craft our diplomatic and strategic inititives with a multi-tiered and interactively complex set of audiences in mind. Too often, our leaders are playing primarily to the domestic American audience and then secondarily - and arguably a very distant second - a narrow and westernized foreign elite.
Radical transparency created by the internet and information technologies are breaking down the ability to compartmentalize messages and signals - the amplitude is higher and "broadcasting" can now take place far down the chain with strategic corporals in dusty villages instead of UN ambassadors across polished tables. The rules of the game are changing and we must change with it.
ADDENDUM:
Colonel W. Patrick Lang " How to Work With Tribesmen" (PDF)
David Ronfeldt -"In Search of How Societies Work: Tribes, the First and Forever Form"(PDF)
[ed. note - entry corrected, my apologies to Colonel McCallister and thanks to Dave for the clarification]
Dave Dilegge, editor of The Small Wars Journal has an excellent post up at The SWJ Blog entitled "COIN in a Tribal Society", relaying the contents of an email from Colonel William (Mac) McCallister (USA Ret.), currently an adivser with II MEF in Iraq. A very rich bibilographic entry, McCallister hits hard at the point of our general failure to communicate our words and deeds in a culturally relevant and comprehensible frame:
"The design and execution of a counterinsurgency campaign in tribal society must reflect the opponent’s cultural realities, his social norms and conventions of war and peacemaking. The fight in Anbar province is a “clash of martial cultures” and reflects two divergent concepts of victory and defeat and “rules of play”. The conventions of war and peace for both sides are based on unique historical and social experience and are expressed in each side’s stylized way of fighting and peacemaking. The central tenet in the design and execution of counterinsurgency operations is that it must take into consideration an opponent’s cultural realities so as to effectively communicate intent.
The study of the “tribal terrain” is a challenge. The reason - comprehensive research materials on Iraqi tribal organization, tribal diplomacy, and the art of tribal war and peacemaking are sparse. The majority of reading materials therefore are general and regional in nature and require “reading between the lines” to gain an appreciation for tribal organizing principles, cultural operating codes, and the tribal art of war and peace. The material is intended to assist the student of the tribal art of war and peace in developing an analytic structure for assessing personal experiences, observations and unit after action reports. The ultimate objective is to assist the warfighter in assessing the effectiveness of counterinsurgency tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and cultural criteria to determine why certain approaches succeed or fail."
I will go one better; the United States government has not come to grips with the need to craft our diplomatic and strategic inititives with a multi-tiered and interactively complex set of audiences in mind. Too often, our leaders are playing primarily to the domestic American audience and then secondarily - and arguably a very distant second - a narrow and westernized foreign elite.
Radical transparency created by the internet and information technologies are breaking down the ability to compartmentalize messages and signals - the amplitude is higher and "broadcasting" can now take place far down the chain with strategic corporals in dusty villages instead of UN ambassadors across polished tables. The rules of the game are changing and we must change with it.
ADDENDUM:
Colonel W. Patrick Lang " How to Work With Tribesmen" (PDF)
David Ronfeldt -"In Search of How Societies Work: Tribes, the First and Forever Form"(PDF)
Labels: COIN, counterinsurgency, dilegge, diplomacy, iraq, radical transparency, small wars journal, swj blog
¶ 6:59 PM
Comments:
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Mark,
I wish I could take credit - but my post was a relay of an e-mail I received from COL William (Mac) McCallister (USA Ret.). Mac is currently an adivser with II MEF in Iraq. The PPT presentation and the reading list are his work.
As always, thanks for the link.
Dave Dilegge
I wish I could take credit - but my post was a relay of an e-mail I received from COL William (Mac) McCallister (USA Ret.). Mac is currently an adivser with II MEF in Iraq. The PPT presentation and the reading list are his work.
As always, thanks for the link.
Dave Dilegge
# posted by 
: Monday, 23 July, 2007
: Monday, 23 July, 2007
Hi Dave,
Thanks for the correction - I did not catch that and thought you were pulling the bibiliography from the SWJ reference library. I'll fix it in a sec
Thanks for the correction - I did not catch that and thought you were pulling the bibiliography from the SWJ reference library. I'll fix it in a sec
Excellent but perhaps, from a larger perspective, a bit mad. That is -- with all due respect to the diligence, training, skill, and education of the folks involved -- this is superbly done but possibly futile.
As a thought experiment -- after all, we don't have to make our Iraq policy work, and hence some critical distance -- let's take a step back and consider rephrasing this in different contexts.
As a gang-control problem in a US inner city. Sounds good! Except, of course, this problem has grown worse over the past decade or so.
As a program to develop a 3rd world nation. Sounds good! Except, of course, there is an almost perfect reverse correlation between a nation's success at development and the aid received. Studies over decades have shown little or no impact from even well-designed developmental assistance.
Perhaps put this in the context of other COIN ops run by foreign forces. Where foreign military personnel have -- despite lacking substantial numbers of staff knowing the language and culture -- defeated a large-scale locally-rooted insurgency.
Of course, there are none. (there are gray areas, as in all human affairs, but no clear examples).
Perhaps COIN by foreign infidels is like the philosophers' stone: useful but not possible (today, at least).
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As a thought experiment -- after all, we don't have to make our Iraq policy work, and hence some critical distance -- let's take a step back and consider rephrasing this in different contexts.
As a gang-control problem in a US inner city. Sounds good! Except, of course, this problem has grown worse over the past decade or so.
As a program to develop a 3rd world nation. Sounds good! Except, of course, there is an almost perfect reverse correlation between a nation's success at development and the aid received. Studies over decades have shown little or no impact from even well-designed developmental assistance.
Perhaps put this in the context of other COIN ops run by foreign forces. Where foreign military personnel have -- despite lacking substantial numbers of staff knowing the language and culture -- defeated a large-scale locally-rooted insurgency.
Of course, there are none. (there are gray areas, as in all human affairs, but no clear examples).
Perhaps COIN by foreign infidels is like the philosophers' stone: useful but not possible (today, at least).
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